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Abstract— In this paper we propose a novel observer-based
method for anomaly detection in connected and automated
vehicles (CAVs). The proposed method utilizes an augmented
extended Kalman filter (AEKF) to smooth sensor readings of
a CAV based on a nonlinear car-following motion model with
time delay, where the leading vehicle’s trajectory is used by
the subject vehicle to detect sensor anomalies. We use the
classic χ2 fault detector in conjunction with the proposed AEKF
for anomaly detection. To make the proposed model more
suitable for real-world applications, we consider a stochastic
communication time delay in the car-following model. Our
experiments conducted on real-world connected vehicle data
indicate that the AEKF with χ2-detector can achieve a high
anomaly detection performance.
I. INTRODUCTION
Security of connected and automated vehicles (CAVs) has
turned into a more critical topic in the recent decade due to
the rapid development of intelligent transportation systems
that are founded on the connected and automated vehicle
technology. A CAV system integrates both connected vehicle
(CV) and automated vehicle (AV) technologies, which play a
complementary role in improving the operational efficiency,
sustainability, and safety of transportation systems [1]–[7].
Developing an integrated CAV system not only requires
equipping vehicles and the transportation infrastructure with
a wide array of sensors, actuators and control devices, but
also requires vehicle to vehicle (V2V) and vehicle to infras-
tructure (V2I) communications. Such communications enable
controllers that can regulate traffic using network-level in-
formation, thereby enhancing mobility in the transportation
system; however, the quality of the control strategies become
highly dependent on the quality of the input data. As such
anomalies in sensor readings, delays in the communication
network, or cyber attacks can make such controllers prone to
failure, potentially causing unsafe conditions for road users.
In addition to informing control strategies, CV data can be
used by automated vehicles for trajectory planning. CAVs
may fuse data obtained from their onboard sensors as well
as data receives through V2V and V2I communications to
plan their trajectories. As such, anomalies in the data or
cyber attacks targeting their sensor systems can lead to fatal
consequences.
A robust anomaly detection scheme designed for CAVs
should satisfy three characteristics. First, any anomaly de-
tection scheme should be able to effectively identify false
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negatives and false positives, both of which may result in
severe negative outcomes as discussed in [8]. To avoid false
positives, the anomaly detection methods should be able to
distinguish between anomalies and true unexpected changes
in network conditions that may trigger unexpected responses
from road users. Therefore, to reduce the number of false
positives the anomaly detection scheme should be able to
incorporate network-level information. To avoid false nega-
tives, anomaly detection methods should be able to identify
the noise, introduced by the vehicles’ onboard sensor systems
or the communication channel, to make sure decisions are not
affected by it. Secondly, anomaly detection methods should
not pose additional computational burden on a CAV’s already
constrained computational and energy resource. Finally, the
anomaly detection techniques should be fast enough to be
implementable in highly-dynamic traffic streams.
Anomalous sensor readings could be caused by different
form of anomalies. Based on previous studies [8], [9], we use
the following anomaly taxonomy: (i) Short anomaly, which
is a short-lived and sudden change in the observed data; (ii)
Noise, which is a longer-term change (multiple successive
readings) in variance of the observed data; (iii) Bias, which
is an offset from the true sensor readings; (iv) Gradual drift,
which is a gradual drift in the observed data and (v) Miss,
which refers to missing data observations that could result
from Denial of Service (DoS) attacks or sensor failures. In
this paper, we do not explicitly account for the anomaly type
‘miss’; however, in practice, depending on its duration, the
‘miss’ anomaly type can be viewed as either ‘instant’ or
‘bias’ anomalies, where for a short or long period of time,
respectively, the sensor readings are changed to zero.
The objective of this paper is to develop an anomaly
detection scheme that can incorporate network level informa-
tion, does not require large computational resources, and can
detect anomalies in real-time. In our previous work [8], we
developed a framework that combined an adaptive extended
Kalman Filter, enhanced using a car-following motion model,
and a data-driven fault detector to detect CAV anomalies
in the presence of communication time delay. This paper is
an extension of our previous work, where we reformulate
the problem using an augmented state in order to capture
the bias caused by the time delay, and thereby improve
the detection performance of the traditional χ2-detector.
Moreover, the new method proposed in this paper can be
seamlessly coupled with the CNN-KF framework proposed
in [9]; experiments indicate improvements in performance by
implementing the new method. We use the same assumptions
as in [8] throughout this paper: (i) vehicles follow their
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immediate upstream vehicle (referred to as the leader),
according to a car-following model; and (ii) there is a time-
delay associated with obtaining the leader’s information (e.g.,
location and velocity).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section
II we provide a brief review of the existing literature in
CAV anomaly detection. In Section III we introduce the
problem formulation and our solution method. In section
IV we conduct a case study based on a well-known car-
following model and compare the performance with our
previous method. Finally, in section V we conclude the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Sensor failures and cyber attacks make two of the main
contributors to anomalous sensor readings in CAVs. Sensor
failure may result from environmental conditions (e.g. dense
vegetation and tall buildings that block GPS satellite signals),
sensor age, low battery supply, etc. [10]. There has been a
number of studies focusing on cyber attacks on CAVs [11]–
[13]. Experimental studies have demonstrated the vulnerabil-
ity of a wide array of CAV sensors, e.g., speed, acceleration
and location sensors, to cyber attacks or faults. For example,
a false injection attack through the CAN bus or the on-
board diagnostics (OBD) system of a CAV can result in
any of the five anomaly types introduced in this paper [11].
As another example, Trippel et al. demonstrate how the in-
vehicle acceleration sensor could be vulnerable to acoustic
injection attacks [12]. Spoofing/jamming attacks on a CAV’s
GPS unit is another example of attackers inducing anomalies
into sensor values [13].
Because of the potentially severe consequences of failing
to detect anomalous sensor readings and/or anomalous data
received through commutation channels, an increasing num-
ber of studies have focused on cyber security in CAVs. A
wide range of frameworks founded on graph theory [14],
deep learning [9], and game theory [15], among others, have
been proposed for this purpose. In this paper we propose
a new anomaly detection framework based on extended
Kalman filter (EKF) with a car-following motion model
and an augmented state space. This framework offers an
anomaly detection method that (i) directly targets reducing
the number of false positive errors in anomaly detection;
(ii) does not require significant computational resources;
and (iii) can be executed in real-time, making it suitable
for dynamic traffic environments. This framework is an
extension of our previous work [8], where we focused on
detection of anomalous sensor readings and recovery of the
corrupt signals. Similar to [8], we use a car-following model
as the motion model of an EKF in order to use the trajectory
of the subject vehicle’s leading vehicle, thereby capturing
some network-level information. The leading vehicle’s in-
formation is received through basic safety messages (BSM)
enabled by V2V communications. When using the leading
vehicle’s information to inform the motion of the subject
vehicle, the time-delay in the communication channel could
create theoretical challenges that would exclude the use of
traditional fault-detectors, such as the χ2 detector. In our
previous work, we addressed this issue by introducing a data-
driven fault detector. In this work We adopt an augmented
state for EKF, which makes it possible to use a traditional χ2
detector. Additionally, in this paper we analyze the impact
of stochastic time delay in receiving the leading vehicle’s
information. Our experiments show a boost of detection per-
formance of χ2-detector with augmented state formulation,
i.e. augmented extended Kalman filter (AEKF). Additionally,
they show a lower mean squared error (MSE) compared with
our previous formulation under time delay.
III. METHODS
In this section, we first discuss how to reformulate a
car-following model into a continuous motion model with
time delay using an augmented state. Augmenting the state
allows us to compensate for the potential bias caused by
the approximation process and model inaccuracy. Based on
that, we then formulate a new continuous nonlinear state-
space model with discrete measurements based on a car-
following model, where the continuous state-transition model
represents the intrinsic nature of a vehicle’s response to the
actions of its immediate leader, and the discrete measurement
model represents the discrete nature of sensor sampling.
Next, we analyze the impact of stochastic time delay on the
system. Finally, we apply the augmented extended Kalman
filter (AEKF) to the state-space model, and use the resulting
AEKF model in conjunction with a χ2-detector to find
anomalies.
A. Car-Following Model with Time Delay
We use a typical car-following model as described in [16]:
dn(t) = xn−1(t)− xn(t)
d˙n(t) = vn−1(t)− vn(t)
v˙n(t) = f (vn(t− τ),dn(t− τ), d˙n(t− τ))
(1)
where v˙n(t), vn(t), xn(t) are the acceleration, speed, and
location of the nth vehicle, to which we refer as the subject
vehicle or the following vehicle, respectively. In Eq. 1, dn(t)
and d˙n(t) are the headway and the speed difference between
the subject vehicle and its leading vehicle (also referred to as
the leader), i.e. the (n−1)th vehicle, respectively. Parameter
τ denotes time delay, intended to capture the time lapsed
between the moment the leader performs an action, to the
moment the subject vehicle acts in response. For now we
consider a constant time delay τ; however, later we relax the
constant assumption by considering a stochastic time delay.
Function f is the stimulus function.
Since we are analyzing the subject vehicle’s sensors, we
define the state vector of the nth vehicle in continuous
time as sn(t) = [xn(t),vn(t)]
T ∈ R2. Similarly, we define
the input vector containing information received from the
leading vehicle as un(t) = [xn−1(t),vn−1(t)]T . Consequently,
we can recast Eq. (1) as a function of sn(t), producing a
car-following model that maps the state into an actionable
decision for the subject vehicle:
v˙n(t) := fv (sn(t− τ),un(t− τ)) (2)
where fv denotes the stimulus function describing velocity
in a continuous sate space.
B. State-Space Model with Continuous State and Discrete
Measurement
In this section we define a state-space model with a
continuous state-transition model and discrete measurements,
which will be used for AEKF. Based on previous definition
of the state vector sn(t), the state-transition model satisfies
the following differential equation:
s˙n(t) =
[
x˙n(t)
v˙n(t)
]
=
[
eT2 sn(t)
fv(sn(t− τ),un(t− τ))
]
, (3)
where e2 = [0,1]T is the standard basis vector.
Ideally when τ = 0, the state-space model in equation
(3) satisfies the Markovian property, allowing for applying
AEKF. However, in practice, τ is usually a nonzero value
affected by various factors, e.g., communication network or
data processing delay, etc.. As such, in practice AEKF cannot
be applied to equation (3), since the derivative of the state
vector is determined by multiple previous state vectors.
In order to apply AEKF, we approximate Eq. (3) in the fol-
lowing way: Based on the bounded acceleration assumption,
we can obtain a delay differential equation (DDE), describing
the delayed state-transition model:
s˙n(t) =
[
x˙n(t)
v˙n(t)
]
=
[
eT2 sn(t− τ)+
∫ t
t−τ an(r)dr
fv(sn(t− τ),un(t− τ))
]
=
[
1,0,1
0,1,0
]
×
 e˜T2 sn(t− τ)fv(sn(t− τ),un(t− τ))∫ t
t−τ an(r)dr

=
[
1,0,1
0,1,0
]
×
 e˜T2 s˜n(t− τ)fv(e˜T12s˜n(t− τ),un(t− τ))
e˜T3 s˜n(t− τ)

(4)
where an(t) is the acceleration of the nth vehicle at time t,
and s˜n(t) = [xn(t),vn(t),δn(t)]T denotes the augmented state
vector of sn(t) with augmented state δn(t) =
∫ t
t−τ an(r)dr,
e˜12 = [e˜1, e˜2,0]T , and e˜i ∈ R3 is the standard basis vector
with ith element equal to 1 and 0 otherwise. Since δn(t) is
unknown, we assume it is a constant or a random variable
with small variance. Thus we have δ˙n(t)≈ 0.
The state-transition model with respect to the augmented
state vector s˜n(t) can be presented as follows:
˙˜sn(t) =
x˙n(t)v˙n(t)
δ˙n(t)

=
 e˜T2 s˜n(t− τ)+ e˜T3 s˜n(t− τ)fv(e˜T12s˜n(t− τ),un(t− τ))
0
+θ(t)
= g(s˜n(t− τ),un(t− τ))+θ(t)
(5)
where g(·) is the motion model and θ(t) is the process noise,
which accounts for the error introduced by the approximation
and model inaccuracy.
Finally, using the new augmented state vector s˜n(t), we
obtain a continuous-time state-transition model with discrete-
time measurement as the following:
˙˜sn(t) = g(s˜n(t− τ),un(t− τ))+θ(t)
zn(tk) = h(s˜n(tk))+η(tk), k ∈ {0∪Z+}
(6)
where h(·) is the measurement function, zn(·) denotes sensor
reading of the leading vehicle, η(tk) is the observation
noise, which is assumed to be mutually independent with
the process noise, tk+1 = tk+∆t, k ∈ {0∪Z+}, and ∆t is the
sampling time interval for sensors.
C. Stochastic Time Delay
Now we consider a more general case where the time
delay τs is not a known constant. We assume that τs is a
linear model:
τs = τ+κ, (7)
where κ is zero mean Gaussian distributed with variance σ21 .
Therefore we have E(τs) = τ . We also assume the leading
vehicle’s trajectory obeys a linear model, i.e.,{
x˙n−1(t) = vn−1(t)
v˙n−1(t) = an−1(t).
(8)
Since the leading vehicle’s motion model is unknown, we
assume that the acceleration of the leading vehicle, an−1, is
a Gaussian process with zero mean and variance σ22 .
Claim: A random time delay τs is equivalent to adding
noise into the input vector un(t−τ) with fixed time delay τ .
Proof: By integrating x˙n−1(t− τs), we have
xn−1(t− τs) =
∫ t−τs
0
vn−1(ξ )dξ
=
∫ t−τ−κ
0
vn−1(ξ )dξ
=
∫ t−τ
0
vn−1(ξ )dξ −
∫ t−τ
t−τ−κ
vn−1(ξ )dξ
= xn−1(t− τ)+ ε1(κ, t− τ)
(9)
where ε1(θ , t − τ) = −
∫ t−τ
t−τ−θ vn−1(ξ )dξ . Therefore using
random time delay is equivalent to adding noises ε1(κ, t−
τ) into state xn−1(t − τ). Note that ε1(κ, t − τ) does not
necessarily have zero mean:
Eκ [ε1(κ, t−τ)] =
∫ ∞
−∞
φ(κ)
∫ −κ
0
vn−1(ξ + t−τ)dξdκ (10)
where φ is the Gaussian probability density function.
Similarly, for vn−1, using random time delay is equivalent
to adding noise ε2(κ, t− τ) into vn−1(t− τ):
vn−1(t− τs) = vn−1(t− τ)+ ε2(κ, t− τ) (11)
where ε2(κ, t− τ) does not necessarily have zero mean.
Therefore, the input vector can be expressed as a linear
model:
un(t− τs) = un(t− τ)+ ε(κ, t− τ), (12)
where ε(κ, t− τ) = [ε1(κ, t− τ),ε2(κ, t− τ)]T .
When the time delay of the input vector is stochastic,
the continuous-time state-transition model with discrete-time
measurement is as follows:
˙˜sn(t) = g(s˜n(t− τ),un(t− τs))+θ(t)
zn(tk) = h(s˜n(tk))+η(tk), k ∈ {0∪Z+}.
(13)
Because of the term ε(θ , t − τ), plugging equation (12)
into (13) could cause a non-zero mean for θ(t), depending
on the specific formulation of the car-following model. As
mentioned in the next section, the existence of bias in the
process noise θ(t) could deteriorate the performance of
the traditional χ2 fault detector, whereas using AEKF can
mitigate this issue.
D. Augmented Extended Kalman Filter with Fault Detector
In order to smooth the CAV sensor noise, we apply AEKF
to the state-space model in Eq. (6). Note that for the ease
of notation, we use state vector notation s instead of the
augmented state vector s˜, and we also omit subscript n for
simplicity. AEKF consists of the following 3 steps:
Step 0 - Initialize state mean and covariance:
sˆk|k−1 = E[s(t0)]
Pk|k−1 = Var[s(t0)].
(14)
Step 1 - Predict state and state covariance:
Solve
{
˙ˆs(t) = g(sˆ(t− τ),u(t− τ)),
P˙(t) = F(t− τ)P(t− τ)+P(t− τ)F(t− τ)T +Q(t)
with
{
sˆ(tk−1) = sˆk−1|k−1
P(tk−1) = Pk−1|k−1
⇒
{
sˆk|k−1 = sˆ(tk)
Pk|k−1 = P(tk)
(15)
where F(t−τ) = ∂g∂ s |sˆ(t−τ),u(t−τ) is the first-order approxima-
tion of the Jacobian matrix of function g(·).
Step 2 - Update state and state covariance:
νk = z(tk)−h(sˆk|k−1)
Sk = H(tk)Pk|k−1H(tk)T +Rk
Kk = Pk|k−1H(tk)T S−1k
sˆk|k = sˆk|k−1+Kkνk
Pk|k = Pk|k−1−KkH(tk)Pk|k−1
(16)
where H(tk) = ∂h∂ s |sˆk|k−1 , Q(t) is the covariance matrix of the
process noise at time t, Rk = R(tk) is the covariance matrix
of the measurement noise at time tk, and νk is innovation,
which is the difference between the measurement and the
prediction, at time tk.
One of the classic fault detectors used in conjunction
with Kalman filter is the χ2-detector [17]. Since AEKF is
essentially a special type of Kalman filter, the χ2-detector
can be seamlessly applied to AEKF as well. Specifically, it
constructs χ2 test statistics to determine whether the new
measurement falls into the gate region with the probability
determined by the gate threshold in Eq. 17,
Vγ(k) = {z :(z− zˆk|k−1)T S−1k (z− zˆk|k−1)≤ σ}, (17)
where zˆk|k−1 is the predicted value of measurement at time
tk. The χ2 test statistics for the fault detector is defined
as χ2(tk) = νTk S
−1
k νk. In order to make the χ
2 test provide
meaningful results, the innovation νk should be zero mean
Gaussian distributed with covariance Sk; therefore, we com-
bine it with AEKF, which could compensate the potential
bias caused by time delay.
In summary, we combine AEKF and χ2 fault detector to
detect anomalies and recover the corrupt sensor readings.
Specifically, at each time epoch, the subject vehicle receives
the measurements from both the leading vehicle and its
own onboard sensors. AEKF uses the car-following motion
model to smooth the following vehicle’s speed and location
signals. During the smoothing process, the AEKF generates
the innovation, which is the the discrepancy between the
measurements and the prediction, and sends the innovation
to the fault detector model for anomaly detection. If there is
no sensor anomaly detected, the innovation will be combined
with the measurement at the current time epoch in order
to generate an estimation. Otherwise, the prediction would
replace the estimation, which will be used in the next time
epoch.
IV. CASE STUDY
In this section we use the well-known Intelligent Driver
Model (IDM) proposed by Treiber et al. [18] as our car-
following model of choice, and implement our framework
to compare the anomaly detection performance of the χ2-
detector in conjunction with EKF and AEKF. Since the IDM
has no explicit reaction time and its driving behavior is
given in terms of a continuously differentiable acceleration
function [16], it is suitable for modeling semi-automated
(compared to human) driving. However, it can be easily
extended to capture the communication delay, as described
in the previous section. Note that in order to evaluate system
performance, we assume that the input vector containing the
leading vehicle’s information is not anomalous. We also use a
Gaussian distribution with mean τ and variance 1 to generate
stochastic time delay.
Using the definition of the augmented state s˜n(t) and the
input un(t) in the previous section, the IDM model with fix
time delay τ can be described as the following:
x˙n(t) = vn(t)
v˙n(t) = fv(e˜T12s˜n(t− τ),un(t− τ))
= a
(
1−
(
vn(t− τ)
v0
)δ
−
(
s∗(vn(t− τ),vn(t− τ)− vn−1(t− τ))
xn−1(t− τ)− xn(t− τ)− ln
)2)
with
s∗(vn,∆vn) = s0+ vnT +
vn∆vn
2
√
ab
where a,b,δ ,v0,s0,T and ln are model parameters. The state
vector s˜n has dimension of 3 and the input vector un has
dimension of 2. For detailed information on IDM refer to
[18]. Following the typical parameter values of city traffic
used in [16], we set the parameter values in our study as
follows: a = 1.0,b = 1.5,δ = 4,v0 = 33.75,s0 = 2,T = 1.0,
ln = 5, and define the measurement function h(·) of AEKF
in equation (13) as:
h(s˜) = H · s˜ =
[
1,0,1
0,1,0
]
· s˜.
We use the same dataset as in [8], which is based
on Safety Pilot Model Deployment (SPMD) program [19]
funded by the US department of Transportation, and col-
lected in Michigan. The anomalies are randomly generated
with 5% anomaly rate and injected into the raw dataset using
algorithm 1 in [8].
We implement two sets of models, where model 1 is
composed of the traditional EKF with an IDM motion model
and a χ2-detector, and model 2 is composed of the AEKF
with the IDM model and the χ2-detector. Each model is
implemented under three experimental settings generated by
varying the value of the anomaly parameter ci, i= {1,2,3,4}
of algorithm 1 in [8], which depending on the anomaly
type describes the variance or magnitude of different types
of anomalies. More specifically, values of ci = 1, ci = 0.5,
and ci = 0.1 are used for settings 1, 2 and 3, respectively.
This suggests anomalous readings become more subtle, and
generally more difficult to detect, from setting 1 to setting
3. We also conduct the each experimental setting under 3
different time delays of τ = {0,0.5,1.5} (seconds). Lastly,
the maximum duration of an anomaly, L, is set to 20 for each
setting. In order to evaluate the impact of changing mod-
els/parameters, we compute the Area Under the Curve (AUC)
for each receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve.
TABLE I: AUC of detection performance and its standard deviation across
20 different executions for two models, at the anomaly rate of 5% and in
the presence of all anomaly types. P-values indicate statistical significance
at 5% level using paired t-test between the detection performance of each
pair of models except between for the scenarios with ci = 1 and τ = 0.5.
Model 1 Model 2
τ 0.0 0.5 1.5 0.0 0.5 1.5
ci = 1
0.984 0.931 0.855 0.983 0.945 0.902
±0.015 ±0.028 ±0.034 ±0.022 ±0.030 ±0.038
ci = 0.5
0.972 0.917 0.799 0.969 0.928 0.844
±0.020 ±0.033 ±0.391 ±0.024 ±0.034 ±0.046
ci = 0.1
0.871 0.718 0.576 0.867 0.759 0.731
±0.029 ±0.031 ±0.034 ±0.035 ±0.039 ±0.058
Table I presents the AUC values, averaged over 20 random
instances, of all nine scenarios that are generated by changing
the intensity of anomalies (ci = {1,0.5,0.1}) and time delay
(τ = {0,0.5,1,5}). For each scenario, we use a paired t-
tests with a 5% significant level to determine whether there
is a statically significant difference in the AUC values of
Models 1 and 2. Results indicate that when there is no time
delay, EKF with χ2-detector (model 1) consistently achieves
a better anomaly detection performance than the AEKF with
χ2-detector (model 2). This is because when time delay is
zero, there is no need to compensate for potential bias. Under
such circumstances, the augmented state variable behaves
similarly to additional noise added to the first element of
the state variable (i.e., geo-location) as shown in Eq. (5),
causing a lower detection performance. Results indicate that
model 2 outperforms model 1 in all scenarios where τ > 0,
by capturing the the bias that is generated due to time-delay.
It should be noted that in practice, a zero time delay may
rarely occur, indicating that the augmented state formulation
would perform better in practice. Results also indicate that
there is a degeneracy of performance for each method as the
parameter ci becomes smaller. This observation is in line with
intuition, since smaller ci makes the anomaly more subtle
and therefore harder to detect. Additionally, the trends of
AUC values indicate that as we increase the time delay, the
overall detection performance systemically deteriorates. This
suggests that the time delay in general may have a negative
impact on detection performance.
TABLE II: Mean innovation for each state variable and the MSE for the
two models at zero anomaly rate. MSE is calculated as the squared root of
sum of the MSEs for the two state variables.
τ 0.0 0.5 1.5
Model 1
Mean innovation value of location -0.003 -0.146 -0.436
Mean innovation value of speed 0.022 0.028 0.062
MSE 7.12E-04 0.033 0.098
Model 2
Mean innovation value of location -0.002 -0.033 -0.097
Mean innovation value of Speed 0.024 0.036 0.095
MSE 8.43E-04 0.032 0.095
In order to investigate the effect of using the augmented
state formulation, we find the mean innovation value for the
two state variables (i.e., location and speed) for each model
under the three time delay settings with zero percentage of
anomaly, as presented in TABLE II. As shown in the TABLE
II, AEKF can significantly decrease the background bias in
the first state variable, i.e. location of the subject vehicle,
when there is a time delay. Similar to previous results, when
the time delay is zero, the performance of AEKF deteriorates,
since no potential bias need to be compensated for, and the
augmented state variable only introduces more randomness
in the system. As time delay becomes larger, the effect of bias
correction becomes more prominent. TABLE II also shows
the mean squared error (MSE) in the innovation of the two
models, where MSE is calculated as the squared root of sum
of the MSEs for the two state variables. further confirming
our previous observations–as we increase the time delay, the
reduction in MSE under model 2 (AEKF) becomes larger
compared with that under model 1 (EKF). Figures 1a and 1b
display the scatter plots of normalized innovation for both
EKF and AEKF, generated from the training dataset in our
experiments, when there exits a time delay and
∫ t
t−τ an(r)dr
in Eq. (4) is not zero mean. In the 2-dimensional case, the χ2-
detector defines a circular boundary with its center located at
(0,0), i.e., the blue lines in figure 1, which corresponds to the
thresholding boundary of the χ2-detector with σ = 0.8. We
can see a significant reduction in the mean and variance of
(a) Scatter plot of EKF. (b) Scatter plot of AEKF.
Fig. 1: Example of a normalized innovation sequence being non-zero mean, where τ = 1.5 seconds. The threshold σ of χ2-detector is 0.8.
the normalized innovation of the first state variable in AEKF.
This figure also shows that the innovation sequence of AEKF
resembles a normal distribution more closely, indicating the
suitability of the χ2-detector.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The goal of this study is to develop a framework to detect
anomalous sensor readings and/or data received through V2V
or V2I communications in CAVs. The proposed framework
introduces a computationally light-weight anomaly detection
tool that attempts to minimize false positives in addition
to false negatives by incorporating context from the driving
environment, obtained through V2V communications. How-
ever, the delay in the communication channel can introduce
theoretical challenges that preclude using existing anomaly
detection tools. We resolve this issue by introducing an
augmented extended Kalman filer, in which we use an
augmented state to incorporate the background bias as a
dummy into the state variable. The AEKF is informed by
not only the vehicle’s onboard sensors but also the leading
vehicle’s trajectory. In our case study, we use the well-known
intelligent driver car following model in order to incorporate
the leading vehicle’s information. In conjunction with AEKF,
we use the classic χ2-detector to detect five types of anoma-
lies, which encapsulate general sensor faults and/or cyber
attacks in CAVs. We also analyze the effect of stochastic time
delay on the detection performance. We quantify the effect
of these contributions by conducting experiments under two
scenarios: χ2-detector with an IDM motion model and EKF,
and χ2-detector with an IDM motion model and AEKF.
Results indicate that in the presence of time delay, the second
model outperforms the first. Furthermore, results show that
in the presence of time delay, AEKF can decrease the overall
innovation MSE by compensating for the background bias.
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